Abstract-We consider secure multi-terminal source coding problems in the presence of a public helper. Two main scenarios are studied: 1) source coding with a helper where the coded side information from the helper is eavesdropped by an external eavesdropper and 2) triangular source coding with a helper where the helper is considered as a public terminal. We are interested in how the helper can support the source transmission subject to a constraint on the amount of information leaked due to its public nature. We characterize the tradeoff among transmission rate, incurred distortion, and information leakage rate at the helper/eavesdropper in the form of the rate-distortion-leakage region for various classes of problems.
Secure Source Coding With a Public Helper I. INTRODUCTION N OWADAYS the Internet is an essential part of our daily life. We rely on many online services which inevitably create huge amounts of information flow in the network. With this huge amount of information, the main tasks for network designers are to ensure that the data can be transmitted reliably and also securely across the network. The latter requirement is becoming increasingly acute, especially when sensitive information is involved. Let us imagine a network in which information flows from one node to another through a number of intermediate nodes. The system design generally makes use of these intermediate nodes to help the transmission. However, these nodes might be public devices or terminals which we cannot fully trust with access to significant amounts of our information. This scenario leads to a natural tradeoff between cooperation and secrecy in the system and motivates the study of secure communication and compression in the presence of a public helper.
In this work we consider secure lossy source coding problem involving a public helper under an information leakage rate constraint. The secure source coding problem is essentially a source coding problem with an additional secrecy constraint. For a given source sequence X n , and some relevant information W that is available to the eavesdropper or the public helper, the information leakage rate of the source is defined as the normalized mutual information 1 n I (X n ; W ). The solution to secure lossy source coding problem is the optimal tradeoff among transmission rate, incurred distortion at the decoder, and information leakage rate in the form of the ratedistortion-leakage region. A summary of the problem settings and contributions of this work is given below (see also Table I ).
A. Overview of Problem Setting and Contribution

1) Secure Source Coding With a Public Helper:
First we consider problems of secure lossy source coding with a public helper, as depicted in Fig. 1 . The setting is motivated by a scenario where the helper can only provide side information through a rate-limited communication link which is not secure due to its public nature, i.e., it can be eavesdropped by an external eavesdropper. In the "one-sided helper" setting, the helper communicates through a public link only to the decoder, while in the "two-sided helper" case, the helper broadcasts the same coded side information to both encoder and decoder. We provide an inner bound to the rate-distortion-leakage region for the one-sided helper case based on the Wyner-Ziv like coding scheme 1 and show that it is tight under logarithmic loss distortion, and for the Gaussian case with quadratic distortion and the Markov relation Y − X − Z . For the two-sided helper case, we solve 1 Also referred to as the quantize-and-bin scheme.
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See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. the rate-distortion-leakage tradeoff under general distortion. We note that the one-sided/two-sided helper settings considered in Fig. 1 are essentially extensions of the one-helper problem [1] - [3] to include the presence of an eavesdropper. Variation of the settings where the eavesdropper observes instead the link from an encoder to a decoder were studied in [4] and [5] .
2) Secure Triangular Source Coding With a Public Helper:
Next we consider problems of triangular source coding with a public helper, as shown in Fig. 2 . In contrast to the previous settings where the focus is on leakage at an external eavesdropper, we address the problem of information leakage at a legitimate user. The setting is motivated by a scenario where the helper is a public terminal that forwards information as the protocol requests from an encoder to a decoder. However, the helper might be curious and not ignore the data which may not be intended for him. The problem of characterizing the optimal rate-distortion-leakage tradeoff in general is difficult due to ambiguity of the helper's strategy and the role of side information at the encoder. In this work, we characterize the rate-distortion-leakage regions for various special cases based on different side information patterns available to the encoder, the helper, and the decoder. Our coding schemes are based on the Wyner-Ziv like coding with different strategies for the helper. The contributions are summarized below.
• That is, it is meaningful to take into account Z n at the helper in relaying information to the decoder. Our settings are different from conventional triangular source coding problems in that a decoding constraint at the helper is replaced by a secrecy constraint. Also, all the triangular settings can reduce to the cascade ones when the private link from encoder to decoder is removed (i.e., setting W 3 constant). The results for the cascade settings can therefore be obtained straightforwardly from those of the triangular settings.
Apart from the triangular settings mentioned above, we also consider a slightly different setting where the encoder "broadcasts" the same source description to the helper and the decoder, as depicted in Fig. 3 . Note that this is not a special case of previous triangular settings in Fig. 2 since it is more restrictive than simply setting the rate R 1 = R 3 . Depending on side information pattern, we shall see that, in some cases (settings (A) and (B)), the helper is not helpful in terms of providing additional information to the decoder, i.e., R 2 ≥ 0 is achievable.
B. Related Work
Multi-terminal source coding problems have been studied extensively in various settings. Lossless distributed source coding problem was solved by Slepian and Wolf [6] . The setting has since been extended to the lossy case (cf., e.g., [7] ), and remains open in general. It is unsolved even when only one distortion constraint is required, i.e., one-helper problem [1] , [2] . There exist a few special cases which can be solved completely. This includes the Wyner-Ziv problem [8] , the case where one source is decoded losslessly [9] , and the Gaussian source with quadratic distortion [10] , [11] . Recently, Courtade and Weissman [12] introduced logarithmic loss distortion as a new and interesting distortion measure for lossy distributed source coding and solved the problem completely under this distortion measure. As many of our settings are solved under the logarithmic loss distortion, its definition and important properties, taken from [12] , are briefly given at the end of this section. As for other related multi-terminal source coding problems, Yamamoto in [13] studied and established the rate-distortion regions for the cascade and triangular source coding problems without side information. Variations of the cascade and triangular source coding settings have also been studied in recent years (see, e.g., [14] , [15] ).
Traditionally, most works concentrated only on problems of reliable communication or compression under a distortion constraint. Recently, security has become an important issue in the system design and received substantial attention, i.e., when the goal is to design a communication system that is both reliable and secure. Physical layer security was introduced based on the fact that signals available at a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper usually possess different characteristics. It has gained significant attention due to its advantages in some applications, for example, those where complex cryptographic protocols cannot be implemented. Information theoretic study of physical layer security was pioneered by Wyner in [16] , which introduces and solves the problem of coding for the Wiretap channel. Wyner has shown that perfect secure communication is possible when the channel from the sender to the legitimate receiver is "stronger" than the channel to the eavesdropper. Later generalizations include the case of a broadcast channel with confidential messages by Csiszár and Körner [17] . Several extensions to other multiuser channels including secure coding for multiple access channels, channels with states, etc. are considered in [18] .
More recently, due to potential applications in areas such as privacy in sensor networks and databases (see, e.g., [19] ), and privacy of distributed storage of genomic data (see, e.g., [20] , [21] ), an idea of physical layer security from the source coding perspective was also studied, i.e., source coding with side information subject to an additional secrecy constraint. As before, security/privacy of the source relies mainly on different characteristics of the signals (side information) which are available at the legitimate receiver and eavesdropper. Secure lossless distributed source coding was studied by Prabhakaran and Ramchandran [22] , Gündüz et al. [23] , and Tandon et al. [4] , and the lossy case was recently considered by Villard and Piantanida [5] and Ekrem and Ulukus [24] . Closely related work which characterized the tradeoff between amplifying information about one source and masking another was studied in [25] . Another line of work considers explicit secret key sharing in the system model that is based on the Shannon cipher system [26] - [32] . This includes recent works on secure source coding which consider distortion as a measure of secrecy [33] , [34] . We note that we do not assume any explicit secret key sharing in this work. Nevertheless, in some scenarios, we may be able to exploit some common randomness for secrecy by implicitly generating a secret key using the common side information (Section IV, setting (B)).
Below we give a brief definition and an account of important properties of the logarithmic loss distortion. Under logarithmic loss, we employ a "soft" estimate of the source in terms of a probability distribution over the source alphabet. Logarithmic loss distortion is then a measure of the quality of the soft estimate which can be used as a "penalty" function in several applications. It is used for example as a measure of prediction performance [35] , as a measure of the accuracy of a classifier in machine learning [36] , or as a distortion measure in image processing [37] . Logarithmic loss has an interesting property that, when used as a distortion measure in the Wyner-Ziv (like) problem, side information at the encoder does not improve the rate-distortion region. In other words, there is no "rate loss" due to the absence of side information at the encoder. This property is essential in establishing a couple of complete results in this paper by using the achievable schemes which neglect side information at the encoder. Moreover, under logarithmic loss, the average distortion and conditional entropy (equivocation at decoder) are closely related, allowing us to alleviate the need of an extra auxiliary random variable and associated Markov chain(s) in proving the optimality results of several settings in Section III and IV. The properties described above are reminiscent of those found in the Gaussian settings under quadratic distortion.
Logarithmic Loss Distortion Measure [12] : We let the reconstruction alphabetX be the set of probability distributions over the source alphabet X , i.e.,X := { p : p is a PMF on X }. For a sequenceX n ∈X n , we denoteX i , i = 1, . . . , n, the i th element ofX n . ThenX i , i = 1, . . . , n is a probability distribution on X , i.e.,X i :
is a probability distribution on X evaluated for the outcome x ∈ X .
Definition 1 (Logarithmic Loss): Logarithmic loss distortion measure is defined as d(x,x) = log(
, where 1 {x} : X → {0, 1} is an indicator function such that, for a ∈ X , 1 {x} (a) = 1 if a = x, and 1 {x} (a) = 0 otherwise. That is, d(x,x) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the empirical distribution of the event X = x and the estimatex. Using this definition for symbol-wise distortion, it is standard to define the distortion between sequences as
In the following, we present a couple of lemmas which appear in [12] and are essential in proving results under the logarithmic loss distortion. Lemma 1 is used in achievability proof (inner bound argument), while Lemma 2 is used for upper bounding conditional entropy terms in the converse proof (outer bound argument). Both follow quite directly from the definition of logarithmic loss, but we include their proofs [12] in Appendix A for completeness.
Lemma 1 (Inner Bound Argument): Let U be the argument of the reconstruction function g(·), i.e.,X = g(U ). Then under the logarithmic loss distortion measure, if g(u) is a conditional probability p(x|u),
Lemma 2 (Outer Bound Argument): Let Z be the argument of the reconstruction function g (n) (·), i.e.,X n = g (n) (Z ), then under the logarithmic loss distortion measure, we get
C. Organization
The remaining parts of the paper are organized as follows. In Section II we provide definitions and detailed problem formulations for secure source coding with one-sided/two-sided public helper, depicted in Fig. 1 , and secure triangular source coding with a public helper, depicted in Fig. 2 . Section III provides the rate-distortion-leakage tradeoff for secure source coding with one-sided/two-sided public helper. A Gaussian example for the one-sided helper setting is also given. In Section IV we characterize the rate-distortion-leakage regions for several special cases of secure triangular source coding with a public helper (settings (A)-(C), and the corresponding "broadcast" setting in Fig. 3) .
Notation: We denote the discrete random variables, their corresponding realizations or deterministic values, and their alphabets by the upper case, lower case, and calligraphic letters, respectively. The term X n m denotes the sequence {X m , . . . , X n } when m ≤ n, and the empty set otherwise. Also, we use the shorthand notation X n for X n 1 . The term X n\i denotes the set {X 1 , . . . ,
II. PROBLEM SETTING
First, we consider secure source coding with a helper where the helper's link is public and can therefore be eavesdropped by an external eavesdropper, as depicted in Fig. 1 . We state a detailed problem formulation below and provide characterizations of the rate-distortion-leakage rate tradeoff in Section III.
A. Secure Source Coding With One-Sided Public Helper
Let us consider the setting in Fig. 1 and sends it to the decoder over another noisefree, rate-limited link. Given the source description and coded side information, the decoder reconstructs the source sequence asX n subject to a distortion constraint. We note that the eavesdropper also has access to the coded side information and its own side information Z n .
Definition 2:
2 |, n)-code for secure source coding with one-sided public helper consists of:
• A stochastic encoder F 
The information leakage rate at the eavesdropper who has access to W 2 and Z n is measured by the normalized mutual information
+ is said to be achievable if for any δ > 0 and all sufficiently large n there exists a (|W
The rate-distortion-leakage region R one-sided is the set of all achievable tuples.
B. Secure Source Coding With Two-Sided Public Helper
For the case of two-sided helper, we consider the setting in Fig. 1 when the switch is closed. Since the problem setting is similar to that of the one-sided helper case, details are omitted. The main difference is that coded side information
2 is given to both encoder and decoder. Then, based on X n and W 2 , the encoder generates the source description
1 . That is, the encoding function becomes F (n) 1 that takes (X n , W 2 ) as input and generates W 1 according to p(w 1 |x n , w 2 ).
Next, we consider triangular source coding settings in which the helper plays a role in relaying information from an encoder to a decoder subject to the leakage constraint, as depicted in Fig. 2 . Clearly, there exists a tradeoff between the amount of information leakage to the helper and the helper's ability to support the source transmission. We state general problem formulation below and characterize the optimal rate-distortionleakage rate tradeoff for settings (A)-(C) in Section IV.
C. Secure Triangular Source Coding With a Public Helper
Let us consider the setting in Fig. 2 
3 |, n)-code for secure triangular source coding with a public helper consists of:
, and W (n)
3 are finite sets. The information leakage rate at the helper who has access to W 1 and Z n is measured by
The rate-distortion-leakage region is defined as the set of all achievable tuples.
III. SECURE SOURCE CODING WITH ONE-SIDED/TWO-SIDED PUBLIC HELPER
In this section, we provide characterizations of the ratedistortion-leakage regions for secure source coding with one-sided/two-sided public helper. For the one-sided public helper case, we first provide an inner bound to the ratedistortion-leakage region. Then we show that the inner bound is tight for some special cases including the cases under logarithmic loss distortion measure, and the Gaussian case with quadratic distortion under the Markov chain assumption Y − X − Z . Next, we consider the two-sided helper case and characterize the rate-distortion-leakage region under general distortion function.
A. One-Sided Public Helper Theorem 1 (Inner Bound):
The rate-distortion-leakage region R one-sided contains the convex closure of the set of all tuples
+ for which there exist random variables U ∈ U, and
The cardinalities of the alphabets of the auxiliary random variables can be upperbounded as |U| ≤ |Y|+4, |V| ≤ |X |+1. Remark 1: Our achievable scheme is identical to that of the original one-helper problem. However, the resulting ratedistortion tradeoff is different since the set of optimizing input distributions may change due to an additional leakage constraint. We note also that the problem of characterizing the complete rate-distortion-leakage region under general distortion remains open. This is to be expected in view of the fact that the one-helper problem (without the leakage rate constraint) is still open.
Proof of Theorem 1:
The proof is based on a random coding argument. The achievable scheme follows the standard rate-distortion and Wyner-Ziv like coding scheme. That is, for fixed P U |Y , P V |X , and g(·), randomly generate
For encoding, the helper looks for u n that is jointly typical with y n . If there is more than one, it selects one of them uniformly at random. If there is no such u n , it selects one out of 2 n(I (Y ;U )+ ) uniformly at random. Then it transmits the corresponding index w 2 to the decoder. With high probability, there exists such u n since there are 2 n(I (Y ;U )+ ) codewords generated. The encoder looks for v n that is jointly typical with x n . If there is more than one, it selects one of them uniformly at random. If there is no such v n , it selects one out of 2 n(I (X ;V )+ ) uniformly at random. It then transmits the corresponding bin index w 1 to the decoder. With high probability, there exists such v n since there are 2 n(I (X ;V )+ ) codewords generated. Upon receiving (w 1 , w 2 ), the decoder looks for the unique v n such that it is jointly typical with u n . With high probability, it will find the unique and correct one since there are 2 n(I (U ;V )− ) codewords in each bin b v (w 1 ). Thenx n is put out as a source reconstruction,
As for the analysis of leakage rate, we consider the information leakage averaged over all codebooks C n ,
where (a) follows from the facts that
, and from Lemma 3 and 4 below in which we bound the terms 
The proof of Lemma 3 (and similarly Lemma 4) is given in Appendix B.
For the bounds on the cardinalities of the sets U and V, it can be shown by using the support lemma [38] that it suffices that U should have |Y| − 1 elements to preserve P Y , plus five
, and the distortion constraint. And similarly, it suffices that V should have at most |X | + 1 elements to preserve P X , H (X, U, V ), and the distortion constraint. This finally concludes the proof.
Next, we show that the inner bound provided in Theorem 1 is tight for some special cases, namely, the setting under logarithmic loss distortion measure, and the Gaussian setting under quadratic distortion and the Markov assumption
1) Logarithmic Loss Distortion: Theorem 2 (Logarithmic Loss):
The rate-distortion-leakage region under logarithmic loss distortion R one-sided, logloss is the set of all tuples
+ for which there exists a random variable U ∈ U such that U − Y − (X, Z ) forms a Markov chain and
The cardinality of the alphabet of the auxiliary random variable can be upperbounded as |U| ≤ |Y| + 2. Remark 2: Interestingly, Theorem 2 shows that the achievable scheme for the original one-helper problem (the one used in Theorem 1) is also optimal in the presence of an eavesdropper. Due to the property of logarithmic loss distortion which allows the use of Lemmas 1 and 2 in proving achievability and converse, an additional auxiliary random variable V and its associated Markov chain are not needed in characterizing the rate-distortion-leakage region. This essentially allows us to overcome the common issue faced in establishing a complete result for lossy multi-terminal source coding problem in general.
Proof of Theorem 2 (Sketch of Achievability):
The achievable proof follows the proof of the inner bound in Theorem 1. That is, the scheme consists of the rate-distortion code for lossy transmission of y n via the codeword u n at rate I (Y ; U ) + , and the Wyner-Ziv code at rate I (X; V |U ) + 2 for lossy transmission of x n with u n as side information at the decoder. We can show that the distortion D and the leakage ,
, are achievable. Due to the property of logarithmic loss distortion function (Lemma 1), by choosing g(·) to be a conditional probability on X , we have
Therefore, we obtain the desired achievable rate-distortionleakage expressions. The converse proof uses the fact that for logarithmic loss distortion function,
, and it is given in Appendix C.
Remark 3: We note that the proof of the inner bound in Theorem 1 holds only for bounded distortion measures. However, the logarithmic loss distortion measure is not bounded. To address this issue, we refer to an earlier version of [12] and also [39, Remark 3.4] where the proof of achievability can be extended to logarithmic loss distortion by perturbing the reconstruction probability distribution. That is, we assign a small positive value to the reconstruction probability distribution that takes value zero. By this perturbation, the maximum distortion incurred can be upperbounded, and the proof of the inner bound in Theorem 1 can then be applied with this perturbed reconstruction function.
2) Gaussian Setting Under Quadratic Distortion, and the Markov Relation Y − X − Z:
In this part, we evaluate the rate-distortion region when (X n , Y n , Z n ) are jointly Gaussian and the distortion function is quadratic. Let the sequences
> 0. Note that this satisfies the Markov assumption Y − X − Z . While our main results in previous cases were proven for discrete memoryless sources, the extension to the quadratic Gaussian case is standard and it follows, for example, [40] and [41] .
The rate-distortionleakage region for a Gaussian source with quadratic distortion under the Markov assumption Y − X − Z , R one-sided,Gaussian , is the set of all tuples
+ that satisfy
for some α ∈ (0, 1). Proof: The proof is given in Appendix D. Corollary 1: The minimum achievable distortion for given rates and leakage rate R 1 , R 2 , under the Markov chain assumption Y − X − Z is given by
where
Proof: The proof follows from the result in Theorem 3
where we use the fact that 1/2 log 1 +
, and solve for D. Example 1: We evaluate the minimum achievable distortion for given rates and leakage rate in Corollary 1. For fixed
= 0.2, we plot D min as a function of for given R 1 and R 2 in Fig 4. We can see that, in general, for given R 1 and R 2 , D min is decreasing when increases. This is because the helper is able to transmit more information to the decoder without violating the leakage constraint. However, there exists * such that for any > * we cannot improve D min further by increasing since it is limited by the rate R 2 . This saturation effect can be seen from the expression of D min as a max function in (4). That is, for given R 1 , R 2 , when is sufficiently large, we get
) which is constant. In fact, we can determine the value of * from (4) by solving for in the equation 2 −2R 2 = α * . In fact, * depends only on R 2 as seen also from Fig. 4 that when R 2 = 1.25, we get the same * for different R 1 , e.g., R 1 = 1 or 1.25. We note that D min still depends on R 1 , i.e., it is saturated at a lower level for larger R 1 . To this end, we conclude that at high region, R 2 is a limiting factor of D min .
On the other hand, when is "small," the decreasing region is active, i.e.,
), and D min depends only on R 1 and (not on R 2 ). That is, in the "small" region, D min is limited by so that we cannot improve D min by increasing R 2 further. This can be seen from the plots that, for a given R 1 , three distortion-leakage curves with different R 2 coincide in the small region.
B. Two-Sided Public Helper
In this section, we characterize the rate-distortion-leakage region under general distortion for the case of two-sided public helper.
Theorem 4: The rate-distortion-leakage region R two-sided is the set of all tuples
The cardinality of the alphabet of the auxiliary random variable can be upperbounded as |U| ≤ |Y| + 3. Proof: Our achievable scheme is summarized below. The rate-distortion code is employed for lossy transmission of y n via u n at rate I (Y ; U ) + . Since w 2 is given to both encoder and decoder, source coding with side information known at both encoder and decoder at rate I (X;X |U ) + 2 is used for lossy transmission of x n with u n as side information. The achievable leakage rate proof and the converse proof follow similarly as that of one-sided helper case, and are therefore omitted. Similarly as in [3] , we note that by following the converse proof of one-sided helper case, we in fact proved an outer bound which has the same rate, distortion, and leakage rate expressions as in (5), but with the joint distribution satisfying
Clearly this outer bound includes the achievable region due to the larger set of distributions. To show that the outer bound is also included in the achievable region, we let (R 1 , R 2 , D, ) be in the outer bound with the joint distribution of the form
Then we show that there exists a distribution of the form satisfying the Markov conditions in the achievable region such that the constraints on 
wherep(x|u, x) is induced byp(x, y, z, u,x). We now show that the terms (6) and (7), we havep(
Note that, by summing over (y, z,x) in (6) and (7), we getp(x, u) = p(x, u). Also, p(x|x, u) =p(x|x, u) since p(x|x, u) is the inducedp(x|x, u) by construction. Thus, we conclude that p(x, u,x) = p(x, u,x). For the bound on the cardinality of the set U, it can be shown by using the support lemma [38] that it suffices that U should have |Y| − 1 elements to preserve P Y , plus four more for H (Y |U ), I (X;X|U ), H (X|U, Z ), and the distortion constraint. Remark 4: For the cases of logarithmic loss distortion and the Gaussian source with quadratic distortion specified before, it can be shown that the rate-distortion-leakage regions for the corresponding two-sided helper cases remain the same as those of the one-sided helper cases. This is reminiscent of the wellknown result in the Wyner-Ziv source coding problem with Gaussian source and quadratic distortion that side information Y n at the encoder does not improve the rate-distortion function, i.e., R X |Y (D) = R W Z (D) = [40] . In our case, to prove achievability, we simply neglect the coded side information at the encoder and achieve the same region as in the one-sided helper case. The converse proof also follows that of the one-sided helper case.
IV. SECURE TRIANGULAR SOURCE CODING WITH A PUBLIC HELPER
In this section, we consider related problems where the data transmission involves an intermediate node, termed as public helper. We assume that communication through the helper is not secure, i.e., the helper itself is a public terminal to which we do not want to reveal too much information about the source sequence. We characterize the tradeoff among rate, distortion, and information leakage rate in the form of the rate-distortion-leakage region for different settings of secure triangular source coding with a public helper (settings (A)-(C) described earlier, see also Fig. 2 ). As we shall see, different achievable schemes are shown to be optimal for the triangular settings. In particular, our achievable schemes rely on the Wyner-Ziv like coding with different strategies at the helper. The optimal helper strategy depends heavily on side information available at the helper and decoder. For example, if side information at the helper is "degraded" with respect to that at the decoder, then the simple forwarding scheme is optimal. On the other hand, if side information at the decoder is "degraded," it is optimal to perform decoding and re-encoding at the helper. Table II summarizes optimal encoding schemes (at encoder and helper) for different triangular settings.
A. Triangular Setting (A)
Setting (A) assumes that side information Y n at the decoder is stronger than Z n at the helper in the sense that X − Y − Z forms a Markov chain. We characterize the rate-distortionleakage region under logarithmic loss distortion, and for the Gaussian setting under quadratic distortion.
1) Logarithmic Loss Distortion: Theorem 5 (Triangular (A), Logarithmic Loss):
The ratedistortion-leakage region R tri(A), X-Y-Z, logloss under logarithmic loss distortion and X −Y − Z assumption is the set of all tuples
(8c) Remark 5: Since we assume that X − Y − Z forms a Markov chain (i.e., side information Y n is of higher quality than Z n ), it is optimal to perform Wyner-Ziv coding with respect to side information Y n (to maximally reduce the rate needed to describe the source and thus the leakage rate). The helper ignores side information Z n by simply forwarding the received index. This scheme results in the same achievable rate expressions for R 1 and R 2 . Moreover, with this forwarding scheme at hand, rate-splitting of the index over the cascade and private links turns out to be optimal. Terms on the right hand side of the leakage rate constraint (8c) are simply the leakage terms due to correlated side information Z n , and the index intercepted at the helper.
Proof of Theorem 5 (Sketch of Achievability): Wyner-Ziv coding at rate I (X; U |Y ) + 2 = H (X|Y ) − D + 2 is performed to satisfy the distortion constraint, where the equality is due to the choice of U and the property of logarithmic loss distortion. If H (X|Y ) − D > R 3 , we perform ratesplitting on the Wyner-Ziv index. That is, we split the index into two parts, namely
where (a) follows from the facts that (X n , Z n ) are i.i.d. and independent of the codebook, and from the codebook generation that we have
On the other hand, if H (X|Y ) − D < R 3 , we send the Wyner-Ziv index over the private link, and send nothing over the cascade links, i.e., R 1 ≥ 0, R 2 ≥ 0 are achievable. The corresponding leakage rate is
The converse proof is given in Appendix E.
2) Gaussian Source With Quadratic Distortion and Markov
We assume that X has a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance σ 2 X , i.e., X ∼ N (0, σ 2 X ).
) independent of X, and
The rate-distortionleakage region for Gaussian source with quadratic distortion under the Markov assumption
.
Proof:
The proof is given in Appendix F. Based on the triangular setting in Fig. 5 , one might consider a related scenario where the encoder can only "broadcast" (BC) the same source description to the helper and decoder over the rate-limited digital links, in the sense of Fig. 3, i. e., W 3 = W 1 . Based on the source description and some side information, the helper generates a new description and sends it to the decoder. The rest of the problem formulation for this triangular setting is similar to that of Fig. 5 . We characterize the rate-distortion-leakage region under logarithmic loss distortion and the Markov assumption
Theorem 7 [Triangular (A), Logarithmic Loss, BC]:
The rate-distortion-leakage region R tri(A), X-Y-Z, logloss, BC under logarithmic loss distortion is the set of all tuples
0, the achievability proof uses the Wyner-Ziv coding for encoder/decoder pair at rate above I (X; U |Y ) = H (X|Y ) − D. Since the index W 1 is also available at the decoder, the helper does not need to send anything to the decoder (due to data processing theorem). The leakage proof follows similarly as the proof of Theorem 5. On the other hand, if H (X|Y ) − D < 0, the encoder does not need to send anything, i.e., R 1 ≥ 0, R 2 ≥ 0 are achievable. The corresponding leakage rate is 1 n I (X n ; W 1 , Z n |C n ) = 1 n I (X n ; Z n ) = I (X; Z ). Converse proofs for R 1 and constraints follow similarly as the proof of Theorem 5, while R 2 ≥ 0 is trivial.
Remark 6 In this case, the helper does not help to provide any additional information to the decoder due to the Markov chain assumption X n − Y n − Z n . That is, given (W 1 , Y n ), the decoder has already all information about the source available. Note also that this setting is similar to the source coding setting considered in [5] with the cooperation link from the helper to the decoder. However, the cooperation link does not provide any extra information.
B. Triangular Setting (B)
Setting (B) assumes that common side information Y n is available at both encoder and decoder, as depicted in Fig. 6 . This allows the encoder and decoder a possibility to generate a secret key for protecting the source description sent through the public helper. We characterize the rate-distortion-leakage region with the Markov chain assumption X − Y − Z under logarithmic loss distortion, and for the Gaussian setting under quadratic distortion.
1) Logarithmic Loss Distortion: Theorem 8 [Triangular (B), Logarithmic Loss]:
The ratedistortion-leakage region R tri(B), X-Y-Z, logloss under logarithmic loss distortion is the set of all tuples
(11c) Remark 7: We first note that the availability of side information Y n at the encoder does not improve the rate-distortion tradeoff under logarithmic loss, with respect to the Wyner-Ziv setting [8] (like in the Gaussian case [40] ). Similarly as in Theorem 5, with the Markov chain assumption X − Y − Z , the Wyner-Ziv coding scheme with respect to side information Y n together with forwarding strategy at the helper is optimal. Interestingly though, the common side information at the encoder helps to reduce the leakage rate at the helper by allowing the encoder and decoder to generate a secret key. We can see this from the leakage constraint (11c) above where the leakage rate consists of contributions from the eavesdropper's side information I (X; Z ) and from the source description W 1 which is partially protected by the secret key of rate min{H (Y |X, Z ),
where there is no leakage reduction from the secret key). This role of common side information at the encoder and decoder in another secure source coding setting is also studied in [39] .
Proof of Theorem 8 (Sketch of Achievability):
The proof follows similarly as in the previous triangular case with the additional steps of secret key generation using y n . The achievable scheme below is also similar to that found in [39] . That is, Wyner-Ziv coding at rate I (X; U |Y )+2 = H (X|Y )− D +2 is performed to satisfy the distortion constraint. Then we perform rate-splitting on the Wyner-Ziv index by splitting it into two parts, namely w 1 ∈ [1 : 2 n(H (X |Y )−D−R 3 + ) ], and w 3 ∈ [1 : 2 n(R 3 + ) ]. Next we distinguish between two cases where we further split the index w 1 and where the key rate is sufficient for scrambling the whole index w 1 .
If
Then the secret key k is generated by randomly and independently partitioning sequences in Y n into 2 n H(Y |X,Z ) bins and choosing k as the corresponding bin index of the given y n . The encoder sends w 11 and w 12 ⊕ k over the cascade link, and w 3 over the private link, where w 12 ⊕ k denotes the modulo operation, (w 12 + k)mod2 n H(Y |X,Z ) . 2 The helper forwards the index w 11 and w 12 ⊕ k to the decoder. The decoder can recover w 12 from its key generated by y n . We can show that the tuples satisfying (11) where [a] + = a in (11c) are achievable.
, the secret key is generated by randomly and independently partitioning sequences in Y n into 2 n(H (X |Y )−D−R 3 + ) bins and choosing the corresponding bin index of given y n as a key. The encoder sends w 1 ⊕k over the cascade link, and w 3 over the private link. The helper forwards w 1 ⊕ k to the decoder. We can show that the tuples satisfying (11) where [a] + = 0 in (11c) are achievable. For the detailed achievability proof and converse proof, please see Appendices G and H.
2) Gaussian Source With Quadratic Distortion and Markov Chain Assumption X −Y − Z:
Let the sequences (X n , Y n , Z n ) be i.i.d. according to P X,Y,Z . We assume that X has a Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance σ 2
Theorem 9 [Triangular (B), Gaussian]: The rate-distortionleakage region for a Gaussian source with quadratic distortion under the Markov assumption X −Y − Z , R tri(B), X-Y-Z, Gaussian , is the set of all tuples (R
Proof: The availability of Gaussian side information Y n at the encoder and decoder allows us to generate a discrete secret key at arbitrarily high rate. This implies that we can essentially protect the whole source description sent over the rate-limited link to the helper, and the only leakage to the helper is due to helper's correlated side information Z n . The detailed proof is given in Appendix I.
Again, based on the triangular setting in Fig. 6 , one can consider a related scenario where the encoder can only "broadcast" the same source description to the helper and decoder over the rate-limited digital link, in the sense of Fig. 3 . We characterize the rate-distortion-leakage region under logarithmic loss distortion. Similarly to the result in Theorem 7, the helper is not helpful in terms of helping the transmission due to the Markov assumption X − Y − Z . In other words, W 2 does not provide any extra information to the decoder.
Theorem 10 [Triangular (B), Logarithmic Loss, BC]:
The rate-distortion-leakage region R tri(B), X-Y-Z, logloss, BC under logarithmic loss distortion is the set of all tuples 
Proof: Since X − Y − Z forms a Markov chain and the index W 1 is also available at the decoder, the helper does not need to send anything to the decoder. Hence, the problem turns into a standard secure source coding with side information at both encoder and decoder. The proof follows similarly as that of Theorem 8.
C. Triangular Setting (C)
In setting (C), we consider the case where side information Z n at the helper is also available to the encoder, as depicted in Fig. 7 , under the Markov assumption X − Z − Y . This setting is "dual" to the setting (B) in the sense that we switch the order of side information degradedness, and the availability of helper's side information or decoder's side information at the encoder. We characterize the rate-distortionleakage region for this setting under general distortion.
Theorem 11 [Triangular (C)]:
The rate-distortion-leakage region R tri(C), X-Z-Y is given as the set of all tuples
+ for which there exist random variables U ∈ U and V ∈ V such that (U, V, X) − Z − Y forms a Markov chain, and a function g : U × V × Y →X that satisfy
The cardinalities of the alphabets of the auxiliary random variables can be upperbounded as |U| ≤ |X ||Z| + 3 and |V| ≤ (|X ||Z| + 3)(|X ||Z| + 1). Remark 8 Since we assume a new order of side information degradedness X − Z − Y , it is optimal to first perform Wyner-Ziv coding with respect to side information Z n to maximally reduce the rate needed to describe the source to the helper and thus the leakage rate. The helper then decodes the codeword and re-encodes it using Wyner-Ziv coding with respect to side information Y n . It is shown that this decode and re-bin scheme at the helper is optimal. In other words, side information Z n at the helper is useful in providing extra information to the decoder. We note that if the leakage constraint at the helper is replaced by the decoding constraint under some distortion, the problem turns into the original triangular source coding problem by Chia et al. [15] .
Proof of Theorem 11 (Sketch of Achievability):
The achievable scheme follows the decode and re-bin scheme of [15] . That is, randomly generate 2 n(I (X,Z ;U )+ ) sequences u n (w 1 
Then distribute these sequences uniformly into 2 n(I (X ;U |Z )+2 ) bins b u 1 (w 1 ), w 1 ∈ [1 : 2 n(I (X ;U |Z )+2 ) ]. In addition, we distribute them also uniformly into another 2 n(I (X,Z ;U |Y )+2 ) bins b u 2 (w 2 ), w 2 ∈ [1 : 2 n(I (X,Z ;U |Y )+2 ) ]. Furthermore, for eachw 1 
, randomly generate 2 n(I (X,Z
For encoding, the encoder looks for a sequence u n that is jointly typical with (x n , z n ). If there is more than one such sequence, it selects one of them uniformly at random. If there is no such u n , it selects one out of 2 n(I (X,Z ;U )+ ) uniformly at random. With high probability, there exists such u n since there are 2 n(I (X,Z ;U )+ ) codewords generated. Then it transmits the corresponding bin index w 1 to the helper. Also, the encoder looks for v n that is jointly typical with (x n , z n , u n ). If there is more than one, it selects one of them uniformly at random. If there is no such v n , it selects one out of 2 n(I (X,Z ;V |U )+ ) uniformly at random. With high probability, there exists such v n since there are 2 n(I (X,Z ;V |U )+ ) codewords generated. Then it transmits the corresponding bin index w 3 to the decoder over the private link. Upon receiving the bin index w 1 , the helper node looks for the unique u n such that it is jointly typical with side information z n . With high probability, it will find the unique and correct one since there are 2 n(I (U ;Z )− ) codewords in each bin b u 1 (w 1 ). After that the helper looks for the corresponding bin b u 2 (w 2 ) such that the decoded u n ∈ b u 2 (w 2 ), and transmit the bin index w 2 to the decoder. The decoder, with high probability, will successively find the unique and correct u n and v n that are jointly typical with y n since there are 2 n(I (U ;Y )− ) codewords in each bin b u 2 (w 2 ), and there are 2 n(I (V ;Y |U )− ) codewords in each bin b v (w 3 ). Thenx n is put out as a source reconstruction, wherex i = g(u i , v i , y i ). Since (x n , u n , v n , y n ) are jointly typical with high probability, we can show that
As for the analysis of leakage rate, we consider the information leakage averaged over all codebooks,
where (a) follows from the facts that (X n , Z n ) are i.i.d. and independent of the codebook, and from the codebook generation that we have W 1 ∈ [1 : 2 n(I (X ;U |Z )+ ) ]. The converse proof is given in Appendix J. We also consider the scenario where the encoder broadcasts the source description to the helper and decoder, in the sense of Fig. 3 . We characterize the rate-distortion-leakage region for a general distortion. In this case, unlike the previous cases under settings (A) and (B), the helper is useful in terms of supporting the transmission since its side information Z n is "stronger" than Y n at the decoder due to the Markov chain assumption X − Z − Y . To satisfy the distortion constraint, we are required to satisfy both constraints on the individual rate R 1 and sum-rate R 1 + R 2 (cf. successive refinement problem).
Theorem 12 [Triangular (C), BC]:
The rate-distortionleakage region R tri(C), X-Z-Y, BC is given as the set of all tuples (R 1 , R 2 , D, ) for which there exist a random variable U ∈ U such that (U, X)− Z −Y forms a Markov chain, and a function g : U × Y →X that satisfy
The cardinality of the auxiliary random variable can be upperbounded as |U| ≤ |X ||Z| + 2.
Proof: Since both indices W 1 and W 2 are available at the decoder, we need to satisfy the sum-rate constraint R 1 + R 2 instead of the individual rate R 2 . For achievability, the encoder sends the partial bin index of the selected codeword at rate R 1 and then the helper performs decode and re-bin and sends the remaining part of bin index at rate R 2 to the decoder. The detailed proof is given in Appendix K.
Remark 9: Here we discuss the optimal strategy at the helper in all considered settings. Since the private link in the triangular setting can only provide additional information subject to its rate constraint, the processing ambiguity lies only in the cascade transmission, i.e., what is the best relaying strategy at the helper? For ease of discussion, we will for now neglect the private link, and argue that when side information at the helper is degraded with respect to that at the decoder, the forwarding scheme at the helper is optimal; otherwise, it is optimal to employ a decode-and-re encode type scheme.
• Let us consider the setting (A) in which we assume that X − Y − Z forms a Markov chain (the discussion for setting (B) follows similarly). On the cascade link, in order to attain low distortion at the decoder, we wish to compress the source so that the decoder, upon receiving (W 2 , Y n ), can extract as much information about the source as possible, i.e., maximizing I (X n ; W 2 , Y n ). The joint PMF of this setting after summing out the reconstruction sequences is given by
This suggests that the forwarding scheme at the helper (setting W 2 = W 1 ) is a good strategy, and it is in fact optimal in this case.
• For the other case (setting (C)) where we assume that X − Z − Y forms a Markov chain, the joint PMF after summing out the reconstruction sequences is given by
To see if the forwarding scheme is still optimal, we consider the following inequality (derived from the data processing inequality),
It suggests that, based on information available, the helper can extract more information about X n than the decoder does, regardless of what the helper strategy is. Since W 2 is generated based on (W 1 , Z n ), it is reasonable that the helper takes into account the knowledge about Z n in relaying the information, rather than just forwarding W 1 . It turns out that the decode-and-re encode type scheme at the helper is optimal in this case.
V. CONCLUSION
We study secure source coding problems with a public helper that supports the transmission while there is a risk for information leakage. Two classes of problems are considered, namely secure source coding with a helper where the helper link is eavesdropped, and secure triangular source coding with a public helper who is friendly but curious. We are interested in how the helper can facilitate transmission in these unsecured scenarios. We characterize the rate-distortion-leakage regions for different settings where our achievable schemes are based on the Wyner-Ziv like coding schemes. In the first class of the problems, we present the rate-distortion-leakage regions for one-sided and two-sided helper cases under some specific distortion measure, and show that a standard coding scheme is optimal. We find that, for the logarithmic loss distortion case and the case of Gaussian source with quadratic distortion under a Markov relation, the region is the same for both one-sided and two-sided settings. This observation provides evidence that the availability of (coded) side information at the encoder does not improve the rate-distortion-leakage tradeoff. Furthermore, in triangular settings, we solve several special cases and observe that the optimal operation at the helper in our coding scheme depends heavily on the order of side information degradedness, i.e., when X − Y − Z forms a Markov chain, the forwarding scheme is optimal, and when X − Z − Y forms a Markov chain, the decode and re-bin scheme is optimal. The scenario where the common side information is available at both encoder and decoder, but not at the helper, gives rise to a new, interesting scheme involving secret key generation, and also reveals some connection to secure network coding. It is interesting to note that, in some cases, the availability of side information at the encoder is not useful in terms of rate-distortion tradeoff, but it can be used for secret key generation and thus helps to improve the leakage rate.
APPENDIX A PROOFS OF LEMMAS 1 AND 2
Lemma 1: By definition of the reconstruction function, we get g(u)
x(x|u) = Pr(X = x|U = u). Then we
Lemma 2: By definition of the reconstruction alphabet, we consider the reconstructionX n to be a probability distribution on X n conditioned on Z . In particular, ifx n = g (n) (z), we define s(x n |z) = n i=1x i (x i |z). Note that s is a probability measure on X n . We obtain the following bound on the expected distortion conditioned on Z = z,
By averaging both sides over all z ∈ Z, from the law of total expectation, we obtain the desired result. APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 3 Let us define T to be a binary random variable taking value 1 if (Y n , U n , X n , Z n ) are jointly typical, and 0 otherwise. If Pr(T = 0) ≤ δ for n sufficiently large, we get
where (a) follows since given the codebook, U n is a function of W 2 , (b) follows since Pr(T = 0) ≤ δ , and (c) follows from properties of jointly typical set (see [41, Ch. 2] ) with δ , δ → 0 as → 0, and → 0 as n → ∞.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF CONVERSE FOR ONE-SIDED HELPER
Proof of Converse: For any achievable tuple (R 1 , R 2 , ) , by standard properties of the entropy function, it follows that
where (a) follows from the fact that under logarithmic loss
Lastly, the leakage rate
We proceed by using the standard time-sharing argument. Let Q be a random variable uniformly distributed over the set {1, 2, . . . , n} and independent of X i , By introducing Q in above expressions, it is straightforward to show that rate and leakage rate constraints above can be bounded further by
for some P X,Y,Z P U |Y . The proof is concluded by letting n → ∞. For the bound on the cardinality of the set U, it can be shown by using the support lemma [38] that it suffices that U should have |Y| − 1 elements to preserve P Y , plus three more for H (Y |U ), H (X|U ), and H (X|U, Z ).
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 3
With the assumption that
) independent of X, Y, N 1 , we will prove that the inner bound given in Theorem 1 is tight for this case.
Proof of Achievability:
Y ) independent of Y , and V = X + P, P ∼ N (0, σ 2 P ) independent of X, where α ∈ (0, 1) and
, otherwise setting V constant.
Also, choose g(U, V ) to be an MMSE estimate of X given U and V . With these choices of U, V and g(·), it can be shown that
and
, and
, and lastly,
Proof of Converse: From the problem formulation, the joint PMF P X n ,Y n ,Z n ,W 1 ,W 2 ,X n is given by
It follows that
where (a) follows from the conditional EPI and the fact that
).
Then there must exists
)), and using Jensen's inequality and the fact that log(·) is a concave function.
Lastly,
where (a) follows from the Markov chain Z n − X n − W 2 , (b) follows from the conditional EPI and the fact that Z n = X n + N n 2 , X n conditionally independent of N n 2 given W 2 , (c) follows from substituting h(X n |W 2 ).
APPENDIX E PROOF OF CONVERSE FOR TRIANGULAR SETTING (A)
For any achievable tuple (R 1 , R 2 , R 3 , D, ) , by standard properties of the entropy function, it follows that
where (a) follows from the Markov chains
and the leakage rate
where (a) follows from the Markov chain
and (b) follows from the steps used to bound R 1 + R 3 , and lastly
We end the proof by following the standard time-sharing argument and letting n → ∞.
APPENDIX F PROOF OF THEOREM 6
Since X − Y − Z forms a Markov chain, we let the helper simply forward the index. Also, in the Gaussian setting with quadratic distortion, it is known that side information at the encoder does not improve the rate distortion region. Thus, we neglect this side information in encoding. It is straightforward to show that a set of all tuples (R 1 , R 2 , R 3 , D, ) satisfying the conditions below is an achievable region,
for some P X,Y P Z |Y P U |X and g (·) .
independent of X, Y, N 1 , we will prove that the achievable region above is tight for this case.
Proof of Achievability: Let us choose
. Also, choose g(U, Y ) to be an MMSE estimate of X given U and Y . With these choices of U and g(·), it can be shown that
and lastly
Proof of Converse:
From the problem formulation the joint
It follows that
≥ n/2 log(2πeσ 2 ) − n/2 log(2πeD)
= n/2 log σ 2 D where (a) follows from the Markov chain X n − Y n − Z n and the Markov chain
is the MMSE over all possible estimator of X i for each i = 1, . . . , n, and (c) follows from Jensen's inequality and the fact that log(·) is a concave function. Next
≥ n/2 log σ 2 D where (a) follows from steps used to prove the constraint on
follows from steps used to prove the constraint on R 1 + R 3 .
The constraint
follows straightforwardly from n( + δ n ) ≥ I (X n ; Z n ).
APPENDIX G PROOF OF ACHIEVABILITY FOR TRIANGULAR SETTING (B)
The proof follows the standard random coding argument where we show the existence of a code that satisfies the rate, distortion, and leakage rate constraints. The proof outline is given in the following.
Codebook generation: Fix P U |X , and the functiong : U × Y →X .
• Randomly generating 2 n(
• For secret key generation codebook, we randomly and uniformly partition the set of sequences
. The codebooks are revealed to the encoder, the helper, the decoder, and the eavesdropper. We consider the following two cases.
I) If H (X|Y ) < D, we do not need to send anything over the rate-limited links. Since the decoder knows y n , it can generatex n based on y n . Since (x n , y n ) are jointly typical, it can be shown that this is sufficient to satisfy the distortion, i.e., under the logarithmic loss distortion, we have
Note that this is possible if R k ≤ I (X, U |Y ) − R 3 + . Note also that w u,1 can be deduced from (w u,1k , w u,1l ) .
Encoding at the encoder:
• Given sequences (x n , y n ), the encoder looks for u n that is jointly typical with x n . If there is more than one, it selects one of them uniformly at random. If there is no such u n , it selects one out of 2 n(I (X ;U )+ ) uniformly at random. With high probability, there exists such u n since there are 2 n(I (X ;U )+ ) codewords u n generated.
• Then the encoder wishes to transmit the corresponding bin index w u to the helper and decoder in a secure way by incorporating the secret key, e.g., using "one-time pad" based on the key. To generate a secret key, the encoder looks for an index k for which y n ∈ b K (k). Then the encoder transmits w u,1k ⊕ k and w u,1l to the helper over the cascade link, where w u,1k ⊕ k denotes the modulo operation, (w u,1k + k)mod2 n R k , and also transmit w u,3 to the decoder over the private (triangular) link. The helper simply forwards the indices w u,1k ⊕ k and w u,1l to the decoder. Decoding at the decoder: Upon receiving w u,1k ⊕ k, w u,1l , and w u,3 , the decoder uses its side information y n to generate its own key and decrypt the index w u,1k , and thus the bin index w u . Then it looks for a unique u n that is jointly typical with y n . With high probability, it will find the unique and correct one since there are 
Analysis of leakage rate: The leakage averaged over all codebooks C n , , R 2 , R 3 , D, ) , the constraints on R 1 + R 3 and R 2 + R 3 follow the proof of triangular setting (A) (Appendix E). As for the leakage rate, we have
where (a) follows from the steps used to bound R 1 + R 3 . Also,
We end the proof by following the standard time-sharing argument and letting n → ∞. 
where (a) follows from the Markov chains W 2 − (W 1 , Z n ) − (X n , Y n ) and X n − Z n − Y n , (b) follows from the definition of U i . Next,
For the bound on distortion, we have
and lastly, the leakage rate
where (a) follows from the Markov chain (W 1 , X n ) − Z n − Y n , (b) follows from the Markov chain W 2 − (W 1 , Z n ) − (X n , Y n ). We end the proof by following the standard timesharing argument and letting n → ∞. For the bounds on the cardinalities of the sets U and V, it can be shown by using the support lemma [38] that it suffices that U should have |X ||Z| − 1 elements to preserve P X,Z , plus four more for H (X|U, Z ), I (X, Z ; U |Y ), I (X, Z ; V |U, Y ), and the distortion constraint. The new variable U induces the new V , and for each U = u, it suffices to consider |V| ≤ |X ||Z| + 1 so that P X,Z |U =u , I (X, Z ; V |U = u, Y ), and the distortion constraint are preserved. Thus, the overall cardinality bound for V is |V| ≤ |U|(|X ||Z| + 1) ≤ (|X ||Z| + 3)(|X ||Z| + 1).
APPENDIX K PROOF OF THEOREM 12
Proof of Achievability: The achievability proof follows from a standard random coding argument. The codewords u n (w 1 , w 2 , w ) are generated i.i.d. each according to
The codebook is then revealed to the encoder, helper, and decoder.
Encoder: Given a source sequence x n , and side information z n the encoder first looks for u n (w 1 , w 2 , w ) that is jointly typical with (x n , z n ). If there exists such a codeword, the encoder transmits the smallest w 1 to the helper and the decoder. If not successful, the encoder transmits w 1 = 1. By the covering lemma [41, Ch. 3] , the encoder is successful with high probability since there are 2 n(I (X,Z ;U )+ ) codewords u n (w 1 , w 2 , w ) generated.
Helper: Given an index w 1 , and side information z n the helper looks for a unique (w 2 , w ) such that u n (w 1 , w 2 , w ) is jointly typical with z n . If successful, the helper transmits the corresponding w 2 to the decoder. If not successful, the helper transmits w 2 = 1. By the packing lemma [41, Ch. 3] , the helper is successful with high probability since there are less than 2 n(I (Z ;U )− ) codewords u n (w 1 , w 2 , w ) with a fixed w 1 .
Decoder: Given the indices w 1 and w 2 , and side information y n , the decoder looks for a unique u n (w 1 , w 2 , w ) such that it is jointly typical with y n . If successful, the decoder reconstructs asx n wherex i = g (u i (w 1 , w 2 , w ) , y i ). Otherwise, the decoder puts outx n wherex i = g (u i (w 1 , w 2 , 1), y i ) . By the packing lemma, the decoder is successful with high probability since there are less than 2 n(I (Y ;U )− ) codewords u n (w 1 , w 2 , w ) with fixed (w 1 , w 2 ).
Thus, we have constraints on the achievable rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) such that R 1 ≥ I (X; U |Z ) + [I (Z ; U ) − I (Y ; U ) − R 2 ] + + 2 , or equivalently R 1 ≥ I (X; U |Z ) + 2 and R 1 + R 2 ≥ I (X, Z ; U |Y ) + 2 .
Analysis of the distortion constraint follows standard arguments using the fact that (X n , U n , Y n ) are jointly typical. The leakage rate analysis is given below where we consider the information leakage averaged over all codebooks C n , 
where (a) follows from the definition of U i . For the bounds on the cardinalities of the sets U, it can be shown by using the support lemma [38] that it suffices that U should have |X ||Z| − 1 elements to preserve P X,Z , plus three more for H (X|U, Z ), I (X, Z ; U |Y ), and the distortion constraint.
